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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Beginning in the late hours of September 22, 1998, and 
ending early the following morning, four men invaded three 
homes in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. By the time the four had 
completed their crime spree, Orlando Orta was dead and 
Concepcion Garcia Orta, James Sorhaindo, Reynoldson 
Ferrol, Jacklyn Tredway, and Thomas Barrows had all been 
assaulted. After an investigation, the police arrested four 
men: Juan Crispin, Delroy Josiah, Louis Lopez, Jr., and 
Hernan Navarro. Their trial and conviction form the basis 
for this appeal. 
 
Crispin, Josiah, Lopez, and Navarro ("the defendants") 
raise a variety of issues. The most significant of these 
affects all four defendants and presents an issue of first 
impression: does Pinkerton liability1 apply in the Virgin 
Islands? The defendants also challenge various evidentiary 
rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence of carjacking and 
gun possession. In addition, the defendants argue that the 
District Court erred by not conducting voir dire of a juror 
to determine bias, and by not granting a hearing in 
response to a charge of prosecutorial misconduct. 2 On the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As will be discussed in more detail later in the opinion, "Pinkerton 
liability" is a theory of vicarious criminal liability set forth in 
Pinkerton v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
 
2. Defendants make two additional challenges, which we believe merit 
very little discussion. First, they argue that the District Court had no 
jurisdiction because the crimes charged were not"of the same or similar 
character or part of, or based on, the same act or transaction or two or 
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issue involving Pinkerton liability, we find that the doctrine 
does exist in the Virgin Islands. With respect to this issue, 
and all other issues raised, we will affirm the rulings of the 
District Court. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The trial involved defendants' conduct at three different 
residential locations in St. Croix: 
 
A. 338 Estate Mount Pleasant 
 
On the evening of September 22, 1998, a group of men 
invaded 338 Estate Mount Pleasant, the home of James 
Sorhaindo. Sorhaindo's friend, Reynoldson Ferrol, was also 
in the house at the time. The two were beaten and robbed 
by three masked assailants. Sorhaindo saw the face of one 
assailant, and, at trial, he testified that he thought that 
Navarro was his attacker. Sorhaindo also identified two 
watches and a chain that the police found outside the 
window of the third crime scene. 
 
There were two eyewitnesses associated with this crime, 
Eugenio Guadalupe and Maha Joseph. Guadalupe testified 
that she saw Josiah, Crispin and Lopez from her residence, 
Building Five of the Paradise Project, which is in the 
vicinity of 338 Estate Mount Pleasant, around the time the 
crime occurred. Joseph testified that he lived in Building 
Four of the Paradise Project, and that he had been 
questioned regarding what he had seen around that same 
time. He stated that he had gone to the police station and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
more acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a 
common scheme or plan," which is required by statute in order to give 
the District Court concurrent jurisdiction over the territorial crimes. 48 
U.S.C. S 1612. Based on the ample evidence demonstrating the 
interconnected nature of the crimes, we find this claim to be without 
merit. Second, the defendants object to the use of identification 
evidence. 
We note that the defendants do not challenge anything specific about the 
identifications in this case, but instead focus on the lack of reliability 
of 
identifications in general. Thus, in order to find in their favor on this 
issue, we would have to find that eyewitness identifications are 
inherently unreliable and cannot be admissible in court. We decline to 
do so. 
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told them what he had seen. However, he denied having 
identified the defendants, instead expressing his"love" to 
the defendants in the courtroom and insisting that he had 
been forced to testify. A police officer, Lieutenant Secundino 
Roman Cruz, then took the stand to rebut Joseph's 
testimony, stating that Joseph had come to the police 
station on September 23, 1998, the day after the crime, 
and identified Crispin, Josiah and Lopez as having been in 
the vicinity of 338 Estate Mount Pleasant around the time 
of the crime. 
 
B. 56 Estate Enfield Green 
 
In the early morning hours on September 23, 1998, 
Jackie Tredway and Thomas Barrows were outside 
Tredway's residence, 56 Estate Enfield Green, when they 
were attacked, taken into the house, beaten with a gun, 
and kicked repeatedly. Their assailants told them that if 
they did not hand over their money, they would be killed. 
The intruders also insisted that Tredway give them the keys 
to her van. 
 
After the attack, Tredway looked at photo spreads and 
picked out two men who she said bore a resemblance to 
one of her assailants. Neither of those pictures depicted any 
of the defendants. However, in court, she did identify one 
assailant, Crispin, whose face she had seen under a  
flashlight.3 She also testified that she had seen Crispin in 
a store and recognized him then as having been one of the 
intruders. She added that when she saw the picture of 
Crispin in the paper, she knew he was the man who had 
attacked her. 
 
Tredway also identified items and photos of items that 
the police had recovered, including her car keys. Some of 
these items were found in her van, which had been 
abandoned next to one of the crime scenes, while others 
were recovered either at the site of the third crime scene or 
at Lopez' house. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Tredway noted that because the incident occurred shortly after 
Hurricane Georges, her home was without power. 
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C. 66 Estate Enfield Green 
 
The most serious crimes occurred at the last location, 66 
Estate Enfield Green, the home of Concepcion Garcia Orta 
and her husband Orlando Orta. The couple was asleep in 
bed. The assailants entered the home and shot at the 
couple. Mrs. Orta's hand was mutilated by one gunshot; 
another killed her husband. The intruders stole cash, a 
chain and a watch. 
 
At trial, Mrs. Orta identified the watch that had been 
stolen, which the police discovered during their search of 
Josiah's residence. The police recovered many items at the 
Orta home that were taken from the two previous crime 
scenes, including a camera and minicassette player that 
Tredway later identified as hers. The police also found a 
knife outside the Ortas' bedroom window, with a fingerprint 
matching Navarro's. Additionally, a shoe print was lifted 
matching Josiah's boot print, and a slug found in the door 
was determined to have come from Crispin's gun. The 
doctor who treated Mrs. Orta in the emergency room also 
testified regarding her injuries, and photos of her hand 
were introduced into evidence over a defense objection that 
they were prejudicial and should not be admitted based on 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 
D. Searches of Defendants' Homes 
 
In a series of searches of the defendants' homes, the 
police uncovered a variety of incriminating items. In the 
home of Lopez, the police found a bag with Sorhaindo's 
name on it containing two VCRs, a striped bag with 
Tredway's van keys in it, ammunition similar to that found 
at the Orta home, slugs matching those found both at the 
Orta home and Josiah's residence,4 and clothing matching 
the descriptions given by victims. In Josiah's residence, 
police discovered boots with a print matching that found at 
the Orta home, a watch later identified as Mr. Orta's, and 
slugs matching both those found at the Orta home and at 
Lopez' home.5 And in the residence that Navarro shared 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At trial, Gregory Bennerson, a ballistics expert, testified that this 
type 
of slug was very unusual -- he had only seen that type of ammunition 
six to eight times during his sixteen year career. 
5. Josiah had a running commentary with police during the search, and 
said, "You should have come yesterday, everything was here yesterday. 
The big one was here yesterday." 
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with other family members, the police found a camouflage 
jacket with a gun in the pocket and camouflage pants and 
a t-shirt, clothing that matched the victims' descriptions of 
the assailants' clothing.6 
 
E. Crispin's Arrest 
 
On October 20, 1998, police officers were responding to 
a complaint near Paradise Project when they spotted a 
Nissan driven by Crispin. Once the officers were in pursuit, 
the Nissan turned a corner and the police saw a person flee 
the vehicle. After unsuccessfully chasing the individual, 
they saw the car still had someone in it. The police 
discovered Crispin in the driver's seat, sitting with the seat 
reclined back in an apparent attempt to hide. Crispin did 
get out of the car after the police instructed him to do so, 
but he aroused further suspicion by throwing his keys 
inside the locked car as he was closing the door. The police 
officers then spotted what appeared to be marijuana on the 
front seat and called for back-up. Crispin told Sergeant 
Pemberton, one of the responding officers, that there was a 
gun under the seat. A forensics officer came to the scene 
and recovered a weapon and ammunition from under the 
driver's seat. At trial, ballistics expert Gregory Bennerson 
testified that a slug from the Orta home had been fired 
from this same gun, and also that the same gun had 
expelled a cartridge onto the porch under the window of 
that home. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On April 6, 1999, defendants Crispin, Josiah, Lopez and 
Navarro were charged in a twenty-two count indictment. At 
their consolidated trial, victims Ferrol, Sorhaindo, Tredway, 
Barrows and Orta were among those witnesses that 
testified on behalf of the government. Eyewitnesses 
Guadalupe and Joseph took the stand, as did Lieutenant 
Cruz, who testified regarding what Joseph had originally 
told the police. Another police officer, Jonathan Hitesman, 
testified regarding the collection of evidence at the Orta 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. There is no information in the record regarding a search of Crispin's 
home. 
 
                                7 
  
home, where items from Tredway's home, a knife with 
Navarro's fingerprint, a slug from Crispin's gun, and a shoe 
print matching Josiah's boot were found. In addition, the 
government presented four expert witnesses: Sandra 
Wiersma, who identified the boot print found outside 66 
Enfield Green as matching Josiah's; Gregory Bennerson, 
who testified as a ballistics expert and determined that 
slugs found at the Orta home came from Crispin's gun, and 
were the same types of unusual slugs found at Lopez' 
house; and Kenneth Getz and John Massey, who both 
stated that the fingerprint discovered at the Orta home 
matched Navarro's. The defendants did not take the stand, 
but did present witnesses on their behalf. 
 
The defendants were found guilty by a jury of murder, 
burglary, robbery, possession of a firearm during the 
commission of crimes of violence, assault with the intent to 
commit murder and robbery, and mayhem with intent to 
commit a felony, all of which were charged under Virgin 
Islands statutes. Navarro was found guilty of threatening 
witnesses Sorhaindo and Ferrol, and Crispin alone was 
convicted of possession of a firearm pursuant to 14 V.I.C. 
S 2253(a). All defendants were found guilty of carjacking 
and of possessing a firearm in relation to the commission of 
carjacking, both of which are federal crimes. 
 
The defendants were sentenced to life without parole on 
the murder charge and additional years on the other 
counts. They filed motions for new trials, which were 
denied. Timely Notices of Appeals were filed. These matters 
were consolidated on January 26, 2001. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612, commonly known as the Organic Act: 
 
       [Along with jurisidiction over federal criminal offenses, 
       the District Court of the Virgin Islands has] concurrent 
       jurisdiction with the local courts of the Virgin Islands 
       over those offenses against the criminal laws of the 
       Virgin Islands which are of the same or similar 
       character or part of, or based on, the same act or 
       transaction or two or more acts or transactions 
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       connected together or constituting part of a common 
       scheme or plan . . . . 
 
Id. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
A. Pinkerton Liability 
 
In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), the 
Supreme Court held that the criminal act of one 
conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is"attributable 
to the other[ ] [conspirators] for the purpose of holding them 
responsible for the substantive offense." Id.  at 647. This 
aspect of Pinkerton, commonly referred to as the Pinkerton 
theory of liability or the Pinkerton doctrine, permits the 
government to prove the guilt of one defendant through the 
acts of another committed within the scope of and in 
furtherance of a conspiracy of which the defendant was a 
member, provided the acts are reasonably foreseeable as a 
necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy. Id. at 
647-48. 
 
At trial, the government asked that the jury be given a 
Pinkerton instruction. The District Court granted the 
government's request, finding that Pinkerton's "reasoning 
applying to federal statutes could also apply to local 
statutes." The Court gave the following instruction to the 
jury: 
 
       Counts I through XVII and Counts XX and XXI charge 
       the defendants as principal, aiders and abettors and 
       under a theory of criminal responsibility call[ed] 
       Pinkerton Liability. In order to sustain its burden of 
       proof for Pinkerton Liability, the Government must 
       prove the three essential elements beyond a reasonable 
       doubt: 
 
       1. That a conspiracy existed in that there was an 
       agreement between individuals to align 
       themselves with others in the criminal venture; 
 
       2. That having so aligned themselves together, one 
       or more of the others of them acted to commit 
       the substantive offense; and 
 
       3. That the substantive offense was committed in 
       furtherance of the criminal venture in which the 
       defendant had aligned himself with others. 
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       It is not required that a conspiracy be charged in the 
       indictment for Pinkerton liability to apply, as long as 
       the evidence at trial establishes beyond a reasonable 
       doubt that a conspiracy existed and that the 
       substantive offense was committed in furtherance of 
       the conspiracy. . . . 
 
Defendants make two separate arguments that the jury 
should not have been instructed that Pinkerton  liability 
could apply to territorial crimes. First, they argue that 
when conspiracy has not been charged, there can be no 
Pinkerton liability. Though this is our first opportunity to 
address this issue, we have little difficulty following our 
sister circuit courts of appeals in determining that a 
conspiracy need not be charged in order for Pinkerton's 
doctrine to apply. E.g., United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 
823, 827 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he absence of a conspiracy 
charge does not preclude the district court from applying a 
Pinkerton theory . . . if the evidence so suggests."); Thomas 
v. United States, 748 A.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
("[E]very federal court that has decided[whether Pinkerton 
can be charged when there is no conspiracy charge in the 
indictment] has held that such an instruction is proper."). 
 
The more significant challenge leveled by defendants is 
their contention that the Pinkerton doctrine does not apply 
in trials involving Virgin Islands law. In examining the case 
law, Pinkerton liability has only been mentioned in cases in 
the Virgin Islands involving federal offenses. See, e.g., 
United States v. Koenig, 53 F. Supp. 2d 803, 808 (D.V.I. 
1999). Here, the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction for 
all crimes, not just the federal offenses. 
 
The defendants argue that the Virgin Islands aiding and 
abetting statute, 14 V.I.C. S 11,7  sets forth the only ways a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The aiding and abetting statute, 14 V.I.C.S 11, provides: 
 
       (a) Whoever commits a crime or offense or aids, abets, counsels, 
       commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
       principal. 
 
       (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
       performed by him or another person would be a crime or offense, is 
       punishable as a principal. 
 
Id. 
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defendant can be held criminally responsible for the acts of 
another.8 The government, however, contends that 
"[n]othing in the Virgin Islands Code prohibits the 
application of Pinkerton to territorial crimes." Gov't Br. at 
41. Our review of Virgin Islands case law reveals that 
Pinkerton has never been explicitly applied or rejected. We 
therefore are confronted with an issue of first impression. 
 
Because we find that there is no case law governing this 
precise issue, we look to 1 V.I.C. S 4, which provides: 
 
       The rules of the common law, as expressed in the 
       restatements of the law approved by the American Law 
       Institute, and to the extent not so expressed, as 
       generally understood and applied in the United States, 
       shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin 
       Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of 
       local laws to the contrary. 
 
Id. We are dealing with criminal law, so there is no 
Restatement to consult. We thus must consider whether 
Pinkerton is a "rule[ ] of the common law, . . . as generally 
understood and applied in the United States . . . ." Id. 
Without a doubt, Pinkerton is part of federal common law. 
E.g., United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 
1987) ("[C]oconspirator liability does not have its genesis in 
this statute, but rather in the common law. See Pinkerton, 
328 U.S. at 647."). In addition, it is the rule in the majority 
of jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Walton, 630 A.2d 990, 
997 (Conn. 1993) ("Pinkerton liability is now a recognized 
part of federal criminal conspiracy jurisprudence."). 
Further, we can find no local law to the contrary. The 
aiding and abetting statute makes punishable certain acts 
one commits as a principal but does not speak to, or rule 
out, co-conspirator punishment for an offense. Also, we do 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The defendants also rely on Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 
F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1967), to support their argument concerning Pinkerton 
liability. However, this case is inapposite. Aquino did not address co- 
conspirator liability at all, making no mention of the application of 
Pinkerton liability in the Virgin Islands. Rather, it merely clarified 
that 
the effect of the Virgin Islands aiding and abetting statute, 14 V.I.C. S 
11, 
was to abolish common law distinctions between accessories before and 
after the fact and principals in the first and second degree. Id. at 552-
53. 
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not view the fact that the specific criminal offenses at issue 
punish the commission of the offense, without including 
accomplice or other liability, as reflecting a local law to the 
contrary. 
 
Hence, we conclude that the Pinkerton doctrine does 
apply in the Virgin Islands.9 Thus, we find that the District 
Court did not err in instructing the jury that they could 
convict the defendants under the Pinkerton doctrine. 
 
B. Rule 403 Challenge to the Admissibility of 
       Photographs 
 
The defendants argue that the District Court erred in 
admitting photographs of Mrs. Orta's mutilated hand, 
instead of relying simply on her testimony and that of the 
doctor who treated her in the emergency room. They argue 
that the admission violated Fed. R. Evid. 40310 for two 
reasons. First, the defendants contend that insofar as there 
was other evidence of the injuries, the probative value was 
low. Second, they assert that given the photographs' 
graphic nature, the prejudicial value was high. The 
government responds that because the photographs related 
to the charge of mayhem, which requires a showing that 
Mrs. Orta was "seriously disfigure[d] . . . by . . . mutilation" 
or that a body part was destroyed or disabled, the evidence 
was highly probative and, moreover, not unfairly 
prejudicial. 
 
We have previously held that "[a] district court has broad 
discretion to determine the admissibility of relevant 
evidence in response to an objection under Rule 403." 
United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 442 (3d Cir. 1996). We 
have also stated: "If judicial restraint is ever desirable, it is 
when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Of course, if the legislature of the Virgin Islands does not believe 
that 
Pinkerton should apply to crimes charged under Virgin Islands statutes, 
it can simply enact a "local rule to the contrary." 
 
10. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." 
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appellate tribunal." United States v. Long , 574 F.2d 761, 
767 (3d Cir. 1978). We review for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
We agree with the District Court that the photographs 
had value insofar as they were the best evidence of 
mutilation available, and we see nothing in the record to 
indicate that they were unfairly prejudicial. Therefore, we 
find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. See 
In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 767 F.2d 1151, 
1154 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no abuse of discretion in 
admitting photographs of bodies of plane crash victims with 
third degree burns where conscious pain and suffering at 
issue); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1129 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (noting that photos from crime scene only 
inadmissible when picture of such "gruesome and 
horrifying nature" that danger of inflaming jury outweighed 
its probative value). 
 
C. Rule 16 Challenge: Failure to Supply Written 
       Summary of Expert Testimony 
 
The government called FBI fingerprint specialist Kenneth 
Getz to offer expert testimony that the fingerprint found at 
the Orta home was Navarro's. The defense objected to his 
testimony at trial on the ground that it did not receive the 
required information in advance pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. 
Pro. 16(a)(1)(E), which states: 
 
       At the defendant's request, the government shall 
       disclose to the defendant a written summary of 
       testimony that the government intends to use under 
       Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of 
       Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial. . . . The 
       summary provided under this subdivision shall 
       describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and the 
       reasons for those opinions, and the witnesses' 
       qualifications. 
 
Id. The District Court agreed with the government's 
argument that the defense's failure to raise the issue earlier 
and "trigger the resources of the court . . .[did] not sit well 
with [it]," and, because the defense did not fulfill its 
"obligation to ask for a Daubert hearing," it would admit the 
testimony. 
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Navarro asserts that by only producing in advance of trial 
a two-page Report of Examination regarding the expert's 
examination of the fingerprint found on the knife, without 
information regarding "the bases and the reasons" for the 
expert's opinion, and by not proffering the expert's 
qualifications until trial, the government violated Rule 
16(1)(a)(E). 
 
The government does not dispute that inadvertently it did 
not provide its expert witness's qualifications until trial. 
However, the government notes that the witness's resume 
was immediately produced when the government became 
aware, via a defense motion to exclude expert testimony, 
that it had not been provided. 
 
With respect to Navarro's contention that the government 
failed to list the bases and the reasons for the expert's 
opinion, it argues that due to the content of the expert 
testimony, that is, the determination of "whether the 
fingerprints found on a knife at the murder scene matched 
or didn't match [Navarro's] known prints," Gov't Br. at 70, 
the information provided was sufficient. The government 
contends that, in any event, the defense did not raise this 
issue of discovery noncompliance until trial in a strategic 
effort to exclude the testimony rather than allow the 
government time to produce the missing information. And 
more important, the government maintains that Navarro 
cannot demonstrate any prejudice that resulted. 
 
We will assume, without deciding, that by not providing 
the expert witness's resume to the defense until trial, and 
only providing the defense with a brief summary of the 
expert report, the government violated the requirements of 
Rule 16(a). Accordingly, we must look to Rule 16(d)(2), 
which addresses the situation in which a party fails to 
comply with a discovery request. It states only that, upon 
the court becoming aware of the failure, it "may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing 
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as 
it deems just under the circumstances." Id.  In other words, 
on its face, the Rule does not require a district court to do 
anything -- Rule 16 merely states that the court"may" take 
such actions. 
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In determining whether we should second guess the 
District Court's view of what was "just," we will consider 
any harm caused by the government's violation. In United 
States v. Miller, 199 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1999), the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, where the 
government failed to properly disclose expert witness 
testimony, a new trial was not warranted unless"the 
remedy offered by the district court was inadequate to 
provide [the defendant] with a fair trial." Id. at 420. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that the government's failure to comply with Rule 16 only 
compelled reversal where the appellant "demonstrate[d] 
prejudice to substantial rights [where] [t]he prejudice that 
must be shown to justify reversal for a discovery violation 
is a likelihood that the verdict would have been different 
had the government complied with the discovery rules, not 
had the evidence [been] suppressed." United States v. 
Mendoza, 244 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001). In 
accordance with these holdings, we require a showing that 
the District Court's actions resulted in prejudice to the 
defendant. 
 
We need not specify the parameters of this inquiry 
because, here, Navarro makes no allegation of prejudice. He 
does not attempt to explain how the government's failure 
resulted in a denial of his right to a fair trial. Due to the 
absence of a showing of prejudice caused by the 
government's failure to comply with 16(a)(1)(E), and given 
the discretion explicitly provided to the District Court by 
Rule 16's language, we decline to grant the defendant the 
extreme remedy of a new trial. 
 
D. Admission of Testimony Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 
       801(d)(1)(C) 
 
Maha Joseph, a government witness, was subpoenaed to 
testify that he had told the police, on the day after the 
crime, that he had seen three of the defendants in the area 
of the crime during the time the homes were invaded. On 
the day he was called to testify, Joseph failed to appear in 
court. Once he was apprehended by the United States 
Marshal and brought to court to testify, he denied making 
any such statement to the police and was declared a hostile 
witness. The government then sought to impeach him 
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about the statement he had made to the police regarding 
the defendants. 
 
After Joseph had testified, the government called 
Lieutenant Cruz to the stand and questioned him about 
Joseph's prior statement. The defense objected to the 
admission of his testimony on the grounds that it was 
hearsay. The District Court permitted Cruz to testify, 
finding that as long as the testimony was limited to the 
statement regarding the identification, it fell under Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). Cruz testified that Joseph had reported 
to the police that he had seen the defendants on the night 
of the crime in the vicinity of the crime scene. We review 
the admission of his testimony for abuse of discretion.11 
United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) provides: "A statement is not 
hearsay if . . . the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement, and the statement is . . . one of identification 
made after perceiving the person." The defendants argue 
that the Rule does not contemplate identifications of this 
nature but, rather, pertains to the selection of defendants 
from lineups or photo spreads. They also contend that 
testimony regarding when and where Joseph saw the 
defendants did not qualify as an identification. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Defendants also assert that the District Court erred by not 
conducting a hearing in response to their claim that the government 
committed prosecutorial misconduct by calling Maha Joseph to the 
stand knowing that he would give unfavorable testimony. They argue 
that the government intentionally put Joseph on the stand in order to 
make Detective Cruz' hearsay statements admissible through 
impeachment, which constituted misconduct because impeachment 
"may not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get 
before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible." United States v. 
Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984). The District Court 
concluded that because Joseph "had not previously testified in any 
manner inconsistent with his statement" and there was no "indication he 
had told the Government he intended to recant his prior statement," any 
conclusion by the government regarding how Joseph would testify would 
have been nothing but "a guess." We see no basis in the record to 
conclude that the prosecution engaged in misconduct, and thus will not 
disturb the District Court's ruling. 
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government responds that an identification without the 
when and where would be nonsensical. It also argues that 
the Rule was designed to encompass exactly this type of 
testimony (and not just lineup and photo spread 
identifications). 
 
Statements of prior identifications are admitted as 
substantive evidence because of "the generally 
unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom 
identifications as compared with those made at an earlier 
time under less suggestive conditions." Fed. R. Evid. 801, 
advisory committee notes. We noted in Brink, 39 F.3d at 
426, that evidence is generally admitted under 801(d)(1)(C) 
"when a witness has identified the defendant in a lineup or 
photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at 
trial." We explained that this Rule then permits a third 
person to testify regarding the previous statements of the 
eyewitness. Id.; see also United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 
1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that testimony of FBI 
Agent regarding bank teller's out of court identification was 
properly admitted under 801(d)(1)(C)); United States v. 
O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
FBI Agent testimony regarding prior statements of witness 
who recanted at trial was admissible); United States v. 
Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
Agent's testimony as to witness's identification was not 
hearsay). 
 
Certainly the purpose of the Rule seems to be fulfilled 
here, where Joseph abandoned his previous knowledge of 
the defendants at trial. While we have yet to construe Rule 
801(d)(1)(C) as covering this type of identification, that is, 
one that consists of a person coming forward after a crime 
is committed and saying he saw a particular person at a 
certain place and time, viewing both the Advisory 
Committee notes to Rule 801 and our own case law, we see 
no basis to conclude that Rule 801 does not extend to such 
situations. Any concerns regarding conditions or 
circumstances that might bear on reliability are matters 
going to the weight of the evidence, which can be addressed 
on cross-examination, and should not affect the 
admissibility of the statement. In any event, certainly the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion, nor was the error 
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prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence against the 
defendants. See Fed. R. Evid. 52(a) ("Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded."); United States v. Adams, 252 
F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2001) ("In practice, Rule 52(a) 
applies when the defendant has made a timely objection to 
an error, and the court of appeals normally engages in a so- 
called "harmless error" inquiry to determine whether the 
error was prejudicial to the defendant, with the government 
bearing the burden of persuasion on the issue of 
prejudice."). We cannot imagine that the defendants would 
not have been found guilty but for the detective's testimony 
regarding Joseph's identification. Even if the statement was 
arguably inadmissible, its admission was harmless. 
 
E. Admission of Clothing Seized From Navarro's Home 
 
Navarro challenges the admission into evidence of items 
seized from his home, including a camouflage t-shirt, jacket 
and pants, as well as a .380 pistol. He argues that the 
District Court should not have admitted the evidence 
because it was barred by Fed. R. Evid. 402 and 403. 
Navarro contends that under Rule 402, the items were not 
relevant because he shared the home, and the items were 
not necessarily his but could have belonged to others. 
Additionally, because he contends that the ownership of the 
items could not be ascertained with certainty, he argues 
that their admission subjected him to unfair prejudice. 
 
This claim is without merit. Navarro's argument does not 
really implicate issues of relevancy under Fed. R. Evid. 402, 
or of prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403 but, rather, it goes 
only to the weight of the evidence. Defense counsel had the 
opportunity to address issues regarding the multiple 
occupants of the home on cross-examination and during 
his statements to the jury. In addition, the relevance and 
probative value of the evidence are obvious, given the 
testimony that the assailants wore similar clothing to the 
items found in Navarro's home, and the fact that the 
firearm was found in the pocket of the jacket. 
 
We find no abuse of discretion here. 
 
F. Sufficiency of Evidence of Carjacking  
 
The jury found the defendants guilty of carjacking based 
on the theft of Tredway's van during the course of the 
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robbery and assaults. The carjacking statute requires proof 
of five elements: (1) taking a motor vehicle (2) that had been 
transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign 
commerce (3) from the person or presence of another (4) by 
force or intimidation (5) with the intent to cause death or 
serious harm. 18 U.S.C.A. S 2119. 
 
When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we examine whether the jury could have 
rationally found that each of the challenged elements had 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. United States 
v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1998). We review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 
United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1288 (3d Cir. 1993); 
see also United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 
1992) ("Appellate reversal on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence should be confined to cases where the failure of 
the prosecution is clear."). 
 
The first element is not in dispute. Tredway's van was 
stolen. The defendants also do not dispute the second 
element. However, defendants challenge the proof of the 
third element because Tredway was inside her residence 
and the van was outside. They urge us to depart from our 
ruling in Lake, 150 F.3d 269, which leaves little room for 
argument regarding this issue. In Lake, a man was on a 
beach and had his van parked at a hilltop where it was not 
visible. Id. at 270. His keys were forcibly taken from him by 
the defendant on the beach. Id. at 271. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the evidence did not show he took 
the car "from the person or presence of another." Id. at 272. 
We were unpersuaded by his argument, and found that this 
element meant that the car was "so within his reach, 
observation or control, that he could if not overcome by 
violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it." 
Id. at 272. The circumstances in Lake are sufficiently 
similar to those here so that Lake controls. Therefore, the 
third element is satisfied. 
 
The fourth element is not in dispute, and is clearly 
controlled by United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 
685 (3d Cir. 1999), where we held that the threatened or 
actual force at issue must be employed in furtherance of 
the taking of the car. The evidence here clearly establishes 
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that it was. The fifth and final element is easily satisfied by 
the circumstances under which the car was stolen-- the 
defendants insisted Tredway give them her keys in the 
course of a robbery and assault. See Holloway v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (holding that intent to carjack 
requires that defendant possessed intent to seriously harm 
or kill driver if necessary to steal car.) 
 
We agree with the government. The record clearly 
supports the carjacking convictions. We will, therefore, 
reject the defendants' challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence as to this offense. 
 
G. Sufficiency of Evidence of Gun Possession 
 
Crispin argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for gun possession. As we recounted 
above, Crispin was discovered by the police crouched down 
in the car he had been driving, and when he was ordered 
out, he threw the keys inside the car, then locked the door. 
He then told an officer who had arrived that there was a 
gun under the seat. Forensic testing linked that gun to the 
crimes at issue in the instant case. 
 
Crispin argues that the government failed to prove that 
he possessed the gun as required by 14 V.I.C. S 2253(a): 
 
       Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, 
       possesses, bears, transports or carries either, actually 
       or constructively, openly or concealed any firearm, . . . 
       [and any] such person [who was previously] convicted 
       of a felony in any state, territory, or federal court of the 
       United States, or if such firearm or an imitation thereof 
       was had, possessed, borne, transported or carried by 
       or under the proximate control of such person during 
       the commission or attempted commission of a crime of 
       violence, as defined in subsection (d) hereof, then such 
       person shall be sentenced to imprisonment . . . . 
 
We must determine whether the jury could have rationally 
found that the elements had been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Lake, 150 F.3d at 272. We review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 
Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1288. 
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We note that, here, the operative language of the Virgin 
Islands statute encompasses not only "possession," but 
covers anyone who "bears, transports or carries .. . 
actually or constructively." 14 V.I.C. S 2253(a). Prior to 
November 1996, section 2253(a) made it unlawful for a 
person to have a firearm "under his control in any vehicle." 
14 V.I.C. S 2253 (1996). This phrase was deleted, however, 
and now, where a defendant "had, possessed, bore or 
carried" a firearm in his automobile, the statute no longer 
requires that it be "under his control." No court has yet 
construed the implication of this alteration. 
 
While the language has changed, we have defined the 
concept of "constructive possession" so as to make the 
issue of control still a central theme. We have stated that 
constructive possession exists if an individual"knowingly 
has both the power and the intention at a given time to 
exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or 
through another person or persons." United States v. 
Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 1047 (5th ed. 1979)). Here there is 
no question that Crispin had knowledge of the gun since he 
actually told the police officer that the gun was in the car. 
But, could the jury have found that he had the "power and 
intention" to "exercise control over" the gun? 
 
We think the facts present here could easily justify the 
inference the jury may have drawn in favor of Crispin's 
constructive possession of the gun; these include, his 
operation of the vehicle, his admitted knowledge of the 
firearm's presence in the car, and its location underneath 
the car's front seat and therefore within his reach. In United 
States v. Iafelice, we found constructive possession of drugs 
in the car's trunk, placing considerable weight on the 
defendant's ownership and operation of the car, but also 
stressing the need for these facts to be "considered in the 
context of the surrounding circumstances." 978 F.2d 92, 97 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
 
We previously upheld the finding of constructive 
possession under the former version of 2253(a), where we 
determined the firearm was under the control of the 
defendants. In McKie, the driver and two passengers of the 
car were found to have the firearms under their control, so 
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as to possess them where the guns were all in plain view 
inside the compact car. United States v. McKie , 112 F.3d 
626 (3d Cir. 1997). In Xavier, the driver was found to have 
possession of a gun held by a passenger exiting the car, 
because it was within his "grab area" when it was in the 
passenger cabin. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1289. We believe that 
the operative language of the current statute is, if anything, 
broader than the previous language applied in McKie and 
Xavier in that the concept of possession is expanded. 
Further, it is coupled with other verbs that could apply 
here as well -- "has, . . . bears, transports or carries." 
 
Crispin relies on United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823 
(7th Cir. 1994), to support his argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of a 
firearm. However, Chairez is readily distinguishable. First, 
the court was only considering whether the defendant 
"possessed" a gun as required by the portion of the statute 
at issue, 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). The court opined that "[a] 
defendant must know of the firearm's existence in order to 
have possession or control of it." Chairez , 33 F.3d at 825. 
Chairez was sitting in the passenger seat of a car 
containing marijuana. Id. at 824. After the police and DEA 
agents stopped the car and had the driver and passenger 
get out, they discovered a gun six inches under the 
passenger seat. Id. Chairez successfully appealed his 
conviction for possessing a firearm in connection with a 
drug trafficking offense by demonstrating that there was 
insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the gun. 
Id. at 825. The court found that the government"failed to 
produce even a shred of evidence" that Chairez knew about 
the gun or had ever carried a firearm. Id. Here, Crispin's 
knowledge is well established in the record based on 
Pemberton's testimony that Crispin told him that the gun 
was under the seat. 
 
Clearly, the jury could have rationally found that the 
government established that Crispin "had, possessed, 
bor[e], transported, or carried" the firearm beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, we reject Crispin's claim that there 
is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 
possession of a firearm. 
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H. Failure to Question Juror Regarding Possible Bias 
 
Navarro argues that the District Court erred by not 
questioning a juror to ascertain if she was biased against 
him. The juror in question sent the judge a note on the 
fourth day of the trial, requesting that Navarro stop staring 
at her. The note said: "it doesn't bother me, he doesn't 
scare me, it's just that I don't like it." Id. On the following 
trial day, Navarro's counsel asked that the juror be stricken 
from the jury because she "harbor[ed] specific feelings 
toward Mr. Navarro [that are] negative." Id. The District 
Court denied the motion to strike the juror, stating: "[T]here 
is nothing I have heard that would allow me to conclude 
that this particular [juror] is necessarily harboring feelings 
of negativity towards the defendant Navarro." 12 On appeal, 
Navarro argues that the note shows that the juror was 
biased toward him, and that the Court should have 
questioned the juror in order to explore the issue before 
making this determination. We review the District Court's 
handling of this matter under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 323 
(3d Cir. 1997) ("We review the district court's ruling [not to 
excuse a juror for cause] for an abuse of discretion.") 
 
Navarro relies on Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 
814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), to support his contention. In 
Dowling, the trial judge received a note from a juror 
indicating that the jury had been exposed to extra-record 
information about the facts of the case and about Dowling's 
past criminal record. Id. at 135. The note identified one 
specific juror as the one who was discussing these matters. 
Id. at 136. The judge excused the juror identified in the 
note, id. at 136, but denied the defendant's motion for a 
mistrial after addressing the entire jury panel, none of 
whom indicated that they had been exposed to any 
information that "had rendered [him or her] incapable of 
giving a fair trial." Id. at 135. We held that the failure to 
question the jurors individually was not an abuse of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. While the actual transcript reads that the Court referenced "this 
particular defendant" rather than "this particular juror," the context of 
the Court's statement makes clear that it intended to speak of the juror 
rather than the defendant. 
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discretion, but we reversed on the grounds that"the trial 
judge erred when he failed to develop a record sufficient to 
permit evaluation of the potential prejudice to the 
defendant and failed to make a finding regarding the jurors' 
ability to perform their assigned task which took into 
account whatever information they had received." Id. at 
141. 
 
While Dowling does support Navarro's argument that in 
camera questioning of an individual juror is appropriate in 
some instances to determine prejudice, its reasoning 
focused on juror exposure to prejudicial extra-record 
information. While there may be circumstances which would 
warrant an extension of Dowling, we find that Dowling does 
not apply to the facts of this case. Here, the judge had 
obviously observed the defendant and the proceedings and 
was not confronted with the exertion of an outside influence.13 
While the judge might have questioned the juror, the note 
states that the juror was not bothered by Navarro's alleged 
conduct, giving rise to a clear inference that she was not 
negatively affected by it. Dowling also stands for the 
proposition that the trial judge must be given considerable 
latitude when making such decisions, as "the trial judge 
develops a relationship with the jury during the course of a 
trial that places him or her in a far better position than an 
appellate court to measure what a given situation requires." 
Id. at 137. 
 
In addition, our reasoning in United States v. Murray, 
103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997), though involving somewhat 
different facts, provides additional support for the District 
Court's conclusion. Murray involved a challenge to a 
District Court's denial of a motion to disqualify a juror 
(during jury selection) because he disclosed during voir dire 
that he had read an article regarding the case. Id. at 322. 
In affirming the District Court, we stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. While not necessarily determinative, we do note that under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, extraneous information is viewed as posing a 
unique threat to the deliberative process. Pursuant to Rule 606(b), a 
juror may not testify about the jury's deliberations, except in regards to 
"extraneous prejudicial information . . . improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to 
bear upon any juror." 
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       In determining whether a particular juror should be 
       excused for cause, our main concern is whether the 
       juror holds a particular belief or opinion that will 
       prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
       duties as a juror . . . . Determining whether a 
       prospective juror can render a fair verdict lies 
       peculiarly within a trial judge's province . . . . The trial 
       judge's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on 
       direct appeal, to special deference. 
 
Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The District Court here made an assessment of the 
situation as required by Murray. We see nothing in the 
record here to indicate that the District Court should have 
concluded that the juror in question was incapable of 
"render[ing] a fair verdict," or that it was obligated to 
question the juror in order to make that determination. See 
id.; see also United States v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761, 768-69 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that though judge did not question 
juror individually, note from juror to judge requesting 
private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror 
would not base verdict on evidence). Accordingly, we find 
that the District Court's decision not to question the juror 
before ruling on Navarro's motion to strike was well within 
its discretion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the District 
Court's Judgment and Conviction Orders. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join the opinion of my colleagues in all respects, but 
write separately to express my concern over the carjacking 
convictions under 18 U.S.C. S 2119. See  Maj. Op. at 18-19. 
Although I agree that United States v. Lake 150 F.3d 269, 
272 (3d Cir. 1998), requires that we affirm the instant 
convictions for carjacking, I continue to believe that Lake 
was wrongly decided. Here, as in Lake, the temporal and 
circumstantial nexus between the theft of the keys and the 
subsequent theft of the car is just too attenuated to 
constitute the federal offense of "carjacking." In his 
thoughtful dissent in Lake, Chief Judge Becker explained 
why such an attenuated nexus ought not to establish the 
federal crime of carjacking. He explained: 
 
       When the defendant took the car keys from his victim, 
       . . . [the victim's] car was, in city terms, a block away 
       up the hill, out of sight. Under these circumstances, I 
       would join an opinion upholding Lake's conviction for 
       keyjacking, or for both key robbery and grand larceny. 
       I cannot however agree that he is guilty of carjacking. 
 
150 F.3d at 275 (Becker, C.J. dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). I agree. Although here, the car 
was closer to the keys than the car that was taken in Lake, 
the theft of the keys, and the theft of the car are still two 
discrete actions separated by both time and distance. 
 
Accordingly, but for Lake, I would conclude that the 
evidence here is not sufficient to establish that the vehicle 
was taken "from the person or presence of another" as is 
required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 2119. However, 
inasmuch as we are bound by the holding in Lake , I join in 
the analysis of my colleagues. Under Lake, I must agree 
that the evidence presented here is sufficient to morph this 
"keyjacking," into a carjacking under S 2119. 
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